We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, a proposer is randomly selected, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. The theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium outcomes of a coalitional bargaining game are unique. This generalizes Eraslan (2002) 
1 Introduction Baron and Ferejohn (1989) study a model in which a group of n risk neutral agents divide a fixed pie. In each period a proposer is selected randomly, the proposer suggests a division of the pie, and this division is implemented if it is approved by a winning coalition of the agents. Otherwise the process is repeated until agreement is achieved, with payoffs discounted geometrically. They show that when the model is symmetric in the sense that all agents have the same recognition probability (probability of being selected as the proposer) and discount factor, and a winning coalition is any set of k agents, in all stationary equilibria agreement is reached in the first period with probability one and each agent's ex ante expected utility is 1/n.
For the application motivating Baron and Ferejohn (bargaining among parties in a legislature or parliament) it is natural to suppose that recognition probabilities differ across agents, with larger parties typically having higher recognition probabilities. In a committee one would normally expect that the chair's recognition probability is higher than the recognition probabilities of other members. For several years it was unknown whether there could be multiple stationary equilibria yielding different expected utilities when recognition probabilities or discount factors differ across agents. Eraslan (2002) resolved this problem, showing that, even with unequal recognition probabilities and discount factors, there is a single vector of expected utilities common to all stationary equilibria.
Her analysis is restricted to k-majority rule for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, but in legislative settings it is also natural to allow different agents to have different weights in the voting over approval of a proposal. This direction of generalization is also of interest from the point of view of other applications. In corporate bankruptcies governed by Chapter 11, the voting over approval of a proposed reorganization is asymmetric with respect to different seniority classes of debt, and creditors who are owed more money have greater power. Other examples are described in the next section.
Here we show that, under more general conditions than those considered by Eraslan (2002) , there is a unique vector of expected payoffs that is generated by all of the game's stationary equilibria. Specifically, in addition to allowing different agents to have different recognition probabilities and discount factors, we allow the set of winning coalitions to be arbitrary, and to depend on the proposer, and we allow the sum of the recognition probabilities to be less than one.
Our argument has an interesting mathematical structure. Suppose that C is a nonempty compact convex set and F : C → C is an upper semicontinuous convex valued correspondence. Roughly, the fixed point index assigns an integer to each compact set of fixed points of F that has a neighborhood containing no other fixed points. For any partition of the set of fixed points into such sets, the sum of the indices of the sets must be one. We show that each connected component of the set of fixed points of the relevant correspondence has a neighborhood that has no other fixed points, and that its index is one. Consequently the set of fixed points must consist of a single connected component. We also show that the vector of continuation payoffs is constant in each connected component, so our main result follows. As has been noted (cf. p. 615 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995) ) this method of proving uniqueness is widely applicable, but in all earlier cases we know of elementary methods were also available.
The organization of the remainder is as follows. Section 2 describes some of the extensive literature descended from Baron and Ferejohn (1989) as it relates to our work. Section 3 presents the axioms that characterize the fixed point index, along with their relevant consequences. The model, and the stationary equilibrium concept, are explained formally in Section 4, and basic properties of equilibrium are established in Section 5. Section 6 passes from the definition of stationary equilibrium to a fixed point characterization of the continuation values, and Section 7 proves the main result. At the heart of the proof is a technical result asserting that a certain matrix is positive definite; this is proved in Section 8. Some possible topics for further research on this topic are sketched in Section 9.
Related Literature
Since Baron and Ferejohn's paper, an extensive body of work has grown out of their model and close variants 1 . Several papers consider variations on the Baron and Ferejohn model in which agents are motivated by policy preferences. Among other things, such models typically yield theories of which coalitions will form in equilibrium. Natural hypotheses are that the coalitions that actually form will contain members with similar policy preferences, and that the policies implemented will tend to be centrist. In some cases the median voter rule emerges, or is a limiting special case. In models that combine policy preferences with division of surplus, it is possible to investigate whether allocation of pie ("pork") is excessive. There are many variants of the basic model, and many ways in which the bargaining model might be embedded into some periods of larger dynamic models. Such models can be used to investigate the effects of different institutions. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) compared two different amendment rules. Baron (1989) considers a model in which some coalition controls the chair, so that only members of the coalition are allowed to propose. There are several papers (McKelvey and Riezman (1992) , Baron (1998) , Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) , Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) , Battaglini and Coate 1 With apologies for the inevitable omissions, a fairly comprehensive list is: Baron (1989) , Baron (1991) , McKelvey and Riezman (1992) , Okada (1993) , Merlo and Wilson (1995) , Baron (1996) , Calvert and Dietz (1996) , Okada (1996) , Winter (1996) , Chari et al. (1997) , Persson (1998) , Baron (1998) , Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) , Banks and Duggan (2000) , McCarty (2000b ), McCarty (2000a , Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) , Eraslan (2002) , Eraslan and Merlo (2002) , Jackson and Moselle (2002) , Norman (2002) , Yan (2002) , Ansolabehere et al. (2003) , Banks and Duggan (2003) , Cho and Duggan (2003) , Diermeier et al. (2003) , Adachi and Watanabe (2004) , Diermeier and Merlo (2004) , Yıldırım (2004) , Battaglini and Coate (2005) , Cardona and Ponsati (2005) , Coscia (2005) , , Kalandrakis (2006) . (2005) ) that study models with multiple stages in which the Baron-Ferejohn setup is applied in at least one phase. Other authors have considered applications that go beyond the legislative or parliamentary setting that was the original motivation of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) . Chari et al. (1997) , McCarty (2000b) , and McCarty (2000a) study models in which one of the agents has powers modelled on the US Presidency. Ansolabehere et al. (2003) considers a bicameral legislature. Winter (1996) studies a model based on the UN Security Council in which some actors have veto rights. Specifically, passage of a resolution requires the support of all five permanent members as well as four temporary members, for a total of nine out of the fifteen members of both sorts.
As these examples suggest, the methodology pioneered by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) is emerging as an important tool for addressing a central issue of political science: the relationship between the rules governing political institutions and the outcomes they produce. Perhaps the main alternatives would be the power indices of cooperative game theory. The Shapley value (Shapley (1953) , Shapley and Shubik (1954) ) is a function that assigns a vector of payoffs to each TU game 2 , and the Shapley-Shubik (Shapley and Shubik (1954) ) power index is the application of the Shapley value to simple games. The power indices of Banzhaf (1965 , 1968 ) Deegan and Packel (1972 and Johnston (1978) are functions with the same domain and range: each assigns a vector of individual "powers" to each simple game. In Section 9 we describe how our result opens the way to similar power indices with explicit noncooperative foundations. These foundations are certainly open to question in some applications, but they also invite additional work in the form of alternative models of bargaining. It should be obvious that much of the interest of models of this sort de-2 A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) consists of a set of agents I = {1, . . . , n} together with a specification of a payoff v(S) ∈ R for each coalition S ⊂ I. A TU game is said to be simple if each coalition's payoff is either zero or one. That is, a simple game is essentially a specification of a system of winning coalitions.
rives from uniqueness, or at least some sort of sharp prediction, and indeed our result has direct application to several papers mentioned above and below. In relation to some of the papers discussed above (McCarty (2000b) , Ansolabehere et al. (2003) , ) it strengthens the work by providing uniqueness results that were not available to the authors, or allowing uniqueness to be proved under weaker hypotheses. For instance, Snyder et al. (2005) (pp. 14-15) give an illustrative proof of uniqueness for a particular example, and omit (to save space) proofs of uniqueness for similar examples appearing in that paper. In addition, they consider only equilibria that are symmetric, in that identical agents have the same continuation values, but our result implies that the unique equilibrium must be symmetric. (See Remark 3.) In another case (Winter (1996) ) our result allows immediate generalization of the main result. Finally, the literature contains models (e.g., McCarty (2000a) ) that would become instances of our framework after small modifications. It seems natural to expect that further development of the literature will lead to additional applications, and that our uniqueness result will influence model selection in some instances.
As a practical matter, tractable empirical methodologies typically limit attention to models with unique predictions. In fact there are already several studies taking the Baron-Ferejohn model to data. Diermeier et al. (2003) , and Coscia (2005) study the allocation of ministries to coalition partners in postwar European parliamentary governments. Adachi and Watanabe (2004) study the allocation to ministries to factions of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. Diermeier and Merlo (2004) use European data to investigate whether formateurs are selected randomly, with probabilities proportional to seat share, as in Baron (1991) , or deterministically in order of seat share, as in Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) .
We now describe the history of uniqueness results for the Baron-Ferejohn model, explaining how our model goes beyond earlier results. As Baron and Ferejohn point out, for unanimity rule there is a unique stationary equilib-rium. They also point out that under k-majority rule there are a continuum of stationary equilibria, but that they all have the same vector of continuation utilities for all agents. Specifically, each agent has the same total probability of being included in another proposer's coalition, but there is considerable flexibility as to which proposers include which other agents.
In addition to Eraslan (2002) , papers concerned with uniqueness of equilibrium expected payoffs include Norman (2002) , Yan (2002) , Cho and Duggan (2003) , Yıldırım (2004) , and Cardona and Ponsati (2005) . Norman (2002) shows that equilibrium payoffs may fail to be unique when there are finitely many bargaining periods. Generalizing results in Okada (1993) that did not appear in Okada (1996) , Yan (2002) studies the bargaining protocol analyzed here, with general recognition probabilities, applied to a TU game with a nonempty core, showing that an allocation in the core is realized as the vector of continuation values if and only if it coincides with the vector of recognition probabilities, in which case there are no other stationary equilibrium payoffs. Since we study simple games, which rarely have a nonempty core, the overlap of her results with ours is small. Cho and Duggan (2003) and Cardona and Ponsati (2005) consider models in which the space of outcomes is one dimensional, modelling policy concerns rather than private rewards. Cho and Duggan (2003) establish uniqueness when utility functions are quadratic and provide an example with multiple equilibria when the utility functions are not quadratic. Cardona and Ponsati (2005) establish uniqueness in the case of unanimity and asymptotic uniqueness as the discount factor goes to one. Yıldırım (2004) studies a model in which agents can influence the probability of becoming the proposer by exerting effort, demonstrating uniqueness under unanimity rule and k-majority rule. Merlo and Wilson (1995) and Eraslan and Merlo (2002) study a generalization of the Baron-Ferejohn model in which the size of the pie varies stochastically; Merlo and Wilson (1995) demonstrate uniqueness under unanimity rule, and Eraslan and Merlo (2002) Proposition 1. There is a unique function Λ : C → Z satisfying the following conditions:
whenever F ′ : U → D is an upper semicontinuous convex valued correspondence whose graph is contained in V .
We will not prove this here. Brown (1971) is a standard reference for the fixed point index for continuous functions. The extension of the index to convex valued correspondences can be accomplished using either algebraic topology, extending the work of Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946) , or by exploiting the fact that upper semicontinuous functions can be approximated, in a suitable sense, by continuous functions. This approach was developed in connection with degree theory in Cellina (1969b,a) and Cellina and Lasota (1969) , and is explained in McLennan (1989) . McLennan (2005) surveys topological fixed point theorems, giving some historical background and explaining the relation between the fixed point index and other results in fixed point theory.
It can be shown (e.g., McLennan (1989) ) that Λ(F ) = 1 whenever F : D → D is an upper semicontinuous correspondence. This will also not be proved here. (Since any two continuous functions are homotopic, its validity for functions follows from Normalization and Homotopy; the main difficulty is to show that any u.s.c.c.v. correspondence can be approximated by a continuous function, so that its validity for correspondences follows from Continuity.) In particular, for any partition of the set of fixed points into isolated sets, the sum of the indices of the sets must be one.
Our strategy for proving uniqueness is to show that each fixed point of the relevant correspondence is contained in a connected component of the set of fixed points that is isolated and has index one. Since, by Additivity, the sum of the indices of the components is one, there must be exactly one connected component. We also show that all equilibria in each connected component give rise to the same vector of continuation payoffs.
In principle this strategy for proving uniqueness can be applied in any setting in which a unique fixed point, or connected component of the set of fixed points, is obtained from an economic model. In spite of this, we know of no other uniqueness result that can only be proved in this way: to the best of our knowledge (cf. p. 615 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995) ) this is the first setting in which uniqueness can be obtained in this manner even though more direct methods (e.g., the contraction mapping theorem) are not (so far as we can tell) applicable.
The Model
Let the set of agents be N := {1, . . . , n}. These agents are bargaining over the division of a pie of size 1. In each period a proposer is selected randomly. Let the probability that i is selected to be the proposer be p i , and let p 0 be the probability that no proposer is selected, so
is a vector of nonnegative numbers that sum to 1 − p 0 ≤ 1. For each proposer i there is a set S i = {S i1 , . . . , S iK i } of subsets of N that are sufficient to pass a proposal made by i. Such sets are called winning coalitions for i. We assume that i / ∈ S ik for all k = 1, . . . , K i . (That is, we adopt the convention that the proposer is never a member of the winning coalition; of course this is insubstantial, in that it would be logically equivalent to assume that the proposer is always a member of the winning coalition.) We also assume that S i = ∅ for all i, and that S ′ ∈ S i whenever S ∈ S i and S ⊂ S ′ ⊂ N \ {i}.
The proposer i suggests a division of the pie. There is then a secret ballot concerning whether to accept the proposed division. If the set of agents voting in favor is an element of S i , then the proposal is implemented, and the game ends. Otherwise the process is repeated in the next period.
The utility for agent i resulting from being awarded
n is a vector of discount factors. We only consider stationary equilibria. (It has been well known since Baron and Ferejohn (1989) that in general there can be a continuum of nonstationary equilibria giving different continuation values.) For each i = 1, . . . , n let Π i := ∆(N ) be the space of possible divisions of the pie, interpreted as the set of proposals that i can make when she is the proposer. A stationary strategy for agent i is a pair (π i , ρ i ), where π i ∈ ∆(Π i ) describes her behavior when she is the proposer as a probability distribution over the possible proposals, and
is a measurable function describing her responses to proposals by other agents. For j = i let ρ i (d; j) be the probability that agent i votes to accept d when it is proposed by agent j. For the time being we fix (π, ρ) = ((π 1 , ρ 1 ), . . . , (π n , ρ n )).
These strategies induce expected payoffs at various points in the play in period zero. Let v i = v i (π, ρ) be agent i's expected payoff prior to the selection of a proposer. Let w i = w i (π, ρ) be agent i's expected payoff in the event that she is selected as the proposer. Let w i (d) = w i (π, ρ; d) be her expected payoff if she proposes d ∈ Π i . The probability that a proposal by i of d is accepted is the sum over winning coalitions S ik ∈ S i of the probability that the set of voters voting in favor is S ik . Let
be this probability. Then
Finally, the expected payoff prior to selection of a proposer must satisfy the condition
For any given (π, ρ), the system of linear equations in the variables (v i , w i ) given by (1) and (2) has a unique solution. Specifically, substituting the right hand side of (1) for w i in (2) gives a linear equation
in the variable v i with a coefficient on the right hand side that is less than 1 − p i , since it is a sum of probabilities of disjoint events, each of which is multiplied by 0 or δ i . The vector (π, ρ) is a stationary equilibrium if, for each i = 1, . . . , n:
As in many other voting models, absent an assumption that agents vote sincerely there can be perverse equilibria in which no voter is pivotal. By passing to a more demanding solution concept, such as trembling hand perfection, one can eliminate such equilibria, but the technical details are not of interest here. Similarly, our assumption that agents vote in favor when they are indifferent can be justified, here and in many other bargaining models, by arguing that the proposer can offer slightly more than the continuation value to each member of the targeted winning coalition. In combination with a device to rule out equilibria in which agents vote perversely because they are not pivotal, this argument implies that the only equilibria have the proposer offering exactly the continuation value, which is accepted with probability one. Again, the techniques involved in such arguments are tedious and not of interest here.
Analysis
In this section we establish certain properties of equilibria that typically hold in noncooperative models of bargaining: proposers always make proposals that are just barely acceptable, and these proposals are always accepted, so that agreement is reached in the first period. In addition we show that an agent has a positive expected payoff if and only if that agent's recognition probability is positive. For each i and each S ik ∈ S letS ik ∈ {0, 1} n be the vector whose j 
be the minimal cost of inducing agreement when i is the proposer, and let
be the set of coalitions that achieve the minimum. For each i and
For the remainder of the section we consider a fixed stationary equilibrium (π, ρ). Let v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) be the vectors of numbers determined by the system of equations (1) and (2). We begin with some technical results that establish useful properties of v and w. Let q i := Π i α i (d) dπ i be the probability that an agreement is reached when i is the proposer. Lemma 1. i v i ≤ 1 with equality if and only if i p i q i = 1, i.e., p 0 = 0 and q i = 1 for all i.
Proof. Summing equation (3) over i, and recognizing that the total payout is one whenever an agreement is reached, gives
Thus n i=1 v i is a weighted average of 1 and a number that is not greater than itself, and strictly less than itself if there is any i with v i > 0. Lemma 2. For each i, w i = 1 − ξ i (v). Consequently, conditional on a proposer i being designated, she offers δ j v j to each element of some S * i (v) and this proposal is accepted with probability one. Thus agreement is reached in the first period with probability 1 − p 0 .
Proof. For any S ik ∈ S * i (v), agent i can propose the allocation that gives 1 − ξ i (v) to himself, δ j v j to each agent j ∈ S ik , and 0 to all other agents. This will certainly be accepted according to (E2). Thus
But there is no proposal that will ever be accepted that gives agent i more than this, and in fact w i > δ i v i since it is impossible to have equality in every one of the inequalities above. Clearly the claims follow from this.
Let η ik be the probability that i proposes the allocation in which each member of S ik receives δ j v j and i receives 1 − j∈S ik δ j v j . Define Y ∈ Y by letting y i := k η ikSik . Note that the numbers η ik embody one aspect of indeterminacy: there may be many vectors η i that yield a particular y i , but the equilibrium conditions depend only on 
and
A reduced stationary equilibrium is pair (v, Y ) ∈ [0, 1] n × Y satisfying these two conditions for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Proposition 2. For any stationary equilibrium (π, ρ) the pair (v, Y ), derived in the manner explained above, is a reduced stationary equilibrium. Conversely, if (v, Y ) is a reduced stationary equilibrium, then it is derived from a stationary equilibrium.
Proof. The explanation to this point constitutes a proof that (4) and (5) are satisfied if (v, Y ) is derived from a stationary equilibrium. Given a reduced stationary equilibrium (v, Y ), one can find η ∈ i ∆(S * i (v)) such that y i = k η ikSik for each i. Given such an η, it is straightforward to construct a stationary equilibrium in which each agent i makes a minimally acceptable offer to S ik with probability η ik when she is the proposer, and votes to accept any proposal that offers at least v i .
Thus the analysis of the expected payoffs resulting from stationary equilibria reduces to the study of reduced stationary equilibrium. It may seem that one can reduce to an even smaller system of variables. Let
Then a necessary and sufficient set of conditions for the pair (v, m) ∈ [0, 1] n × M to be derived from a stationary equilibrium is that m ∈ M * (v) and
holds for each i. Unfortunately our analysis cannot be conducted in terms of the simpler system of variables (v, m) because Y is needed to describe the relationship between (ξ 1 (v), . . . , ξ n (v)) and m. Proposition 2 has an important consequence that is a special case of a more general and complete result of Kalandrakis (2006) . Although it may be amplified by membership in minimal winning coalitions or diminished by impatience 3 , an agent's bargaining power is ultimately derived from her recognition probability:
Thus a player i with no recognition probability (p i = 0) is in effect a dummy, and the solutions of (4) and (5) are the ones given by the reduced system obtained by eliminating i from the specification of the bargaining process and from all winning coalitions of other agents. That is, there is a corresponding stationary equilibrium of the game obtained by eliminating i. Conversely, an equilibrium of the reduced game may be construed as an equilibrium of the game that includes i. For this reason there is no loss of generality in assuming that p i > 0 for all i, and we will do so for the remainder.
A Fixed Point Formulation
Only the elements entering equations (4) and (5) are carried forward from our work to this point. That is, we have:
Our goal in the remainder of the paper is to show that all reduced stationary equilibria have the same vector of continuation values v. We begin by introducing some notational conventions that will simplify the algebra to come. In general we will denote n × n matrices by capital letters, with the usual understanding that the corresponding lower case letter is used to denote the entries of the matrix. In addition, given a vector denoted by a lower case symbol, the corresponding upper case letter will denote the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are the components of the vector. Specifically, this treatment will be applied to p, v, δ, and m = Y T p. We say that P (for example) is the diagonalization of p. Let 1 be the n × n identity matrix. By diagonalizing m, p, and δ, (5) can be rewritten as
We need to be able to invert A(Y ).
A nonsingular M -matrix is a square matrix that has positive entries on the diagonal and nonpositive off-diagonal entries, and is dominant diagonal, meaning that for each column, the diagonal entry is greater than the negation of the sum of the off-diagonal elements. Theorem 2.3 of Chapter 6 of Berman (1979) states that a nonsingular M -matrix is invertible, and the entries of its inverse are nonnegative 4 .
Proof. The entries of H(Y ) are
Of course y ij ≤ 1, so the off diagonal entries of H(Y ) are nonpositive, and for each j we have 4 Let B be a nonsingular M -matrix. If Bw = 0 and j is the index for which |w j | is maximal, then the j th component of Bw has the same sign as w j , so w j = 0, i.e., w = 0. Thus B is invertible. Suppose that Bx = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Let j be the index for which |x j | is maximal. Then j ≥ 2 is impossible because in that case the j th component of Bx could not vanish. Thus j = 1, and in fact x 1 > 0 because the first component of Bx is positive. Let k be the index for which x k is minimal. If x k < 0, then the k th component of Bx would be negative, so all components of x are nonnegative. Since the same argument can be applied with any other unit vector in place of (1, 0, . . . , 0), the entries of B −1 are all nonnegative.
5 If A is a nonsingular n × n matrix, u, v ∈ R n are column vectors, and λ := v T A −1 u = −1, then the formula (A + uv (4) and (5) Once v is determined, the vector m of probabilities of being invited to join other proposers' coalitions is determined by (6). Thus:
Remark 2. There is a unique vector m such that m = Y T p for all fixed points Y of F .
An important, if rather obvious, consequence of Theorem 1 is that the equilibrium continuation values respect any symmetry of the given data. Let G be the group of such symmetries: an element of G is a bijection g : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} such that p g(i) = p i and δ g(i) = δ i , and
for all i.
Remark 3. For all fixed points Y of F , all g ∈ G, and all i, ν g(i) (Y ) = ν i (Y ).
Proof. By transforming all objects and equations in the appropriate way, for the given g, one can show that there is a fixed point Y ′ of F such that
7 The Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we study a particular fixed point Y of F . Let v := ν(Y ) and m := m(Y ). It will turn out that the set of fixed points of F is
Since m(Y ′ ) = m, Y ′ also solves minỸ ∈Y i p iỹi ∆v. Since we are assuming that the p i are all positive, it follows that each row y
Theorem 1 follows once we show that F has no fixed points outside of E. Since m is linear and Y is a convex polytope, E is a convex polytope. In particular, E is connected. The proof that E is the entire set of fixed points of F is a matter of showing that:
The polytope Y has J as its affine hull, Y * (v) is a face whose affine hull J * (v) contains the affine spaceÊ, and E =Ê ∩ Y. Here, but not in general, E =Ê.
(i) E has a neighborhood with no other fixed points of F (so it is a connected component of the set of fixed points of F );
(ii) the set of fixed points has only one connected component.
In order to express certain concepts that are derived from linear algebra, we must expand our perspective by introducing the affine hulls 6 J i of Y i and
Usually we will write J * The affine hull of a set S ⊂ R m is the smallest affine subspace that contains S. Equivalently, it is the set of all weighted sums k j=1 α j s j where s 1 , . . . , s k ∈ S and α 1 , . . . , α k ∈ R with α 1 +· · ·+α k = 1. Such a weighted sum is said to be an affine combination of elements of S. If S is its own affine hull, then we say that S is an affine subspace of R m . The affine subspaces of R m are the translates of the linear subspaces.
extension µ : J → R n of m to J . Let
ThenÊ is an affine subspace of J . (See Figure 1. ) We have the diagram of inclusions
Note that the affine hull of E may be a proper subset ofÊ. Specifically, the dimension of E =Ê ∩ Y * (v) may be less than the dimension ofÊ.
Let Z be the vector space of matrices that are parallel to J and orthogonal toÊ, and let Z * be the subspace of Z consisting of those Z that are parallel to J * , so that Z∆v = 0. In an affine space such as J it is possible to add a vector that is parallel to the space to a point in the space, and the difference between any two points in the space is a vector parallel to the space. In particular, each pointỸ ∈ J has a unique representation of the formỸ =Ỹ 0 + Z whereỸ 0 ∈Ê and Z ∈ Z, andỸ ∈ J * if and only if
The elements of J are matrices, and for many purposes it is useful to think of a tangent vector as a matrix. But in some contexts it is appropriate to treat a tangent vector, say T , as a column vector, especially when we evaluate a derivative of a function on J in a direction given by T . Choosing an arbitrary linear coordinate system for the space of vectors parallel to J * , let ζ T denote the vector of coordinates ζ T j of T in this coordinate system. In particular, let B be the matrix with respect to this coordinate system of the derivative at Y of the restriction of ν to {Y } + Z * :
From a technical point of view, the following result is pivotal.
Proof. Section 8.
Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 below express the fundamental intuition underlying the uniqueness result: as one changes the probabilities assigned to the various coalitions, the continuation values of agents who are included more frequently increase, while the continuation values of agents who are included less frequently decrease, so that a change in any direction makes continued change in that direction increasingly expensive. The decomposition J * =Ê + Z * allows us to give a precise expression of this principle:
starting at any Y ∈ E, motion inÊ has no effect on m, and thus no effect on v, but infinitesimal movement along a vector Z ∈ Z * results in an (infinitesimal) increase in the cost of additional movement in the direction Z.
At Y the cost of infinitesimal movement along Z is 0, due to the first order conditions. Thus we should expect that there is a neighborhood V ⊂ Z * of the origin such that for any nonzero Z ∈ V , moving from Y to Y + Z should result in additional expense that is approximately quadratic. In fact, this holds uniformly in the sense that V does not depend on the particular Y ∈ E:
Lemma 7. There is a neighborhood U ⊂Ê of E and a neighborhood V ⊂ Z * of the origin such that
for allỸ 0 ∈ U and all nonzero Z ∈ V .
Proof. Note that, by Lemma 4, ν is a C ∞ function in a neighborhood of Y.
Therefore Lemma 6 implies that there is a neighborhood W ⊂ J of E such that for some ε > 0, p T Z∆ dν dY (Ỹ )ζ Z > ε for allỸ ∈ W and all Z in the unit sphere in Z * . Since E is a compact subset ofÊ, and J * =Ê + Z * , we may choose a neighborhood U ⊂Ê of E and a convex neighborhood V ⊂ Z * of the origin such that U + V ⊂ W ∩ J * . IfỸ =Ỹ 0 + Z whereỸ 0 ∈ U and 0 = Z ∈ V , then
For the given (v, Y ) define
by setting
whereỸ =Ỹ 0 + Z withỸ 0 ∈Ê and Z ∈ Z. Thus we have defined a one parameter family of correspondences
First consider t = 0. The difference between F and H 0 is that F is defined by minimizing over Y while H 0 is defined by minimizing over Y * (v), but, by continuity, forỸ near E the cost minimizing inclusion probabilities in Y i are contained in Y * i (v). Therefore:
Continuing now to t > 0, we have the following two results.
Lemma 9. Let U ⊂Ê and V ⊂ Z * be neighborhoods of E and the origin respectively such that (7) holds for allỸ 0 ∈ U and all nonzero Z ∈ V . Let W ⊂ Y be a neighborhood of E such that W ∩ Y * (v) ⊂ U + V . For each 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, the set of fixed points of H t in W is E.
Lemma 10. E is the entire set of fixed points of H 1 .
One intuition for why direct proof of uniqueness is difficult comes from rewriting equation (5) as
The product m i v i of endogenous variables is a nonlinearity that makes global analysis problematic. The homotopy of correspondences H deforms the problem until, at time 1, this nonlinearity has vanished, with the consequence that local analysis of the situation near E has the implications for the entire set of fixed points of H 1 stated in the last result.
The rest of the argument explains the index-theoretic consequences of the results above:
Proof of Theorem 1. We first find a set W satisfying the conditions laid out in Lemmas 8 and 9. Lemma 7 gives neighborhoods U ⊂Ê and V ⊂ Z * of E and the origin respectively such that (7) holds for allỸ 0 ∈ U and all nonzero neighborhood of E if need be, H 0 (Ỹ ) = F (Ỹ ) for allỸ ∈ W . Lemma 9 implies that E is the set of fixed points of H t in W for each 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, so Continuity implies that the index of E, as a set of fixed points of H t , is constant as a function of t. By Lemma 10, E is the entire set of fixed points of H 1 , so the index of E as a set of fixed points of H 1 is one. Therefore the index of E as a set of fixed points of H 0 is one. Since H 0 agrees with F on W , Additivity implies that the index of E as a set of fixed points of F is one. But Y was an arbitrary fixed point of F , so we have shown that the index of each component of the set of fixed points of F is one. Since Λ Y (F ) = 1, Additivity implies that there can be only one such component, so E is the entire set of equilibria. Lemma 5 implies that all elements of E have the same vector of continuation payoffs.
The remaining steps of the argument are the proofs of Lemmas 6 (in the next section) 9, and 10.
Proof of Lemma 9. Fix t ∈ [0, 1] andỸ ∈ W . Our goal is to show thatỸ is a fixed point of H t ifỸ ∈ E and not otherwise. The image of H t is contained in Y * (v), so we may assume thatỸ ∈ Y * (v). ThereforeỸ decomposes as
IfỸ ∈ E, then Z = 0, so that ζ Z = 0 and ν(Ỹ ) = v by Lemma 5. If
Thus E is contained in the set of fixed points of H t . Now suppose thatỸ ∈ W \ E. IfỸ was a fixed point of H t , it would be in Y * (v), andÊ ∩ Y * (v) = E, so we may assume thatỸ / ∈Ê and thus Z = 0.
The definition ofÊ implies that p
Below we will show that
Multiplying the first inequality by t and the second by 1 − t, then summing, yields
But p TỸ = i p iỹi and p T Y = i p i y i , so there must be some i such that
This implies thatỹ i / ∈ H i (Ỹ , t) and thusỸ / ∈ H(Ỹ , t).
The remaining task is to establish (8). We have
Here the first equality isỸ =Ỹ 0 + Z, and the second equality results from p TỸ 0 = p T Y , which is true because Y,Ỹ 0 ∈Ê. The inequality is from (7), and the third equality is due to the fact that directions in Z * are parallel to
Proof of Lemma 10. ConsiderỸ =Ỹ 0 + Z ∈ Y whereỸ 0 ∈Ê and Z ∈ Z. Lemma 9 implies that all elements of E are fixed points of H 1 , so we need to show thatỸ is not a fixed point of H 1 whenỸ / ∈ E. Suppose this is the case. We may assume thatỸ ∈ Y * (v) because this set contains the image of
we haveỸ / ∈Ê and thus Z = 0.
SinceỸ =Ỹ 0 + Z, Lemma 6 gives
The definition ofÊ gives p
But p TỸ = i p iỹi and p T Y = i p i y i , so there is some i such that
This implies thatỹ i / ∈ H i (Ỹ , 1) and thusỸ / ∈ H(Ỹ , 1).
The Proof of Lemma 6
The given objects relevant to this section are as follows. We have p, δ ∈ We are given a linear subspace Z * of the set of n × n matricesZ such thatZ ∆v = 0 andZ = 0 ⇒ m(Z) = 0 for allZ ∈ Z * . As before we fix a system of linear coordinates on the vector space Z * , with ζ Z denoting Z ∈ Z * in this system of coordinates and B denoting the matrix, with respect to this coordinate system, of the derivative at Y of the restriction of ν to {Y } + Z * . The function Z → Z T p is linear, so there is a matrix Q such that
Proof. The definition of ν implies that, for anyỸ ,
ReplacingỸ with Y + Z, differentiating with respect to a component ζ Z j of ζ Z , and evaluating at Z = 0, gives
(Here b j and q j are the j th columns of B and Q respectively, and Q j is the diagonalization of q j .) We have
Recognizing that Q j v = V q j (this is a general fact about multiplying a vector by a matrix obtained by diagonalizing another vector) and ∆V = V ∆ (multiplication of matrices obtained by diagonalization is commutative) leads to Ab j = V ∆q j . This is true for each j, so AB = V ∆Q, and Lemma 4 states that A is invertible, so the assertion follows from this.
Our goal is to show that
for any 0 = Z ∈ Z * . The last result gives
Since Qζ Z = Z T p, A −1 p = v, and Z∆v = 0, we have
Therefore, for any γ ∈ R,
Consequently it suffices to find γ such that In addition, when i = j we have g ij (γ) = a ij v j + a ji v i −γp i v j −γp j v i ≤ 0 since a ij ≤ p i δ i ≤ p iγ . That is, G(γ) has positive diagonal entries and nonpositive off diagonal entries. Of course the defining formula implies that it is symmetric, so it remains to show that it is dominant diagonal. (The final inequality derives from the fact that γ ≥ δ i .)
Future Research
The set of fixed points of F has a single component, and the equilibrium conditions have a piece-wise linear character. These features incline one to suspect that there is a pivoting algorithm, similar to the simplex algorithm for linear programming, the Lemke-Howson algorithm (Lemke and Howson (1964) ) for two player games, or the Lemke (1965) algorithm for linear complementary problems, that would efficiently compute the stationary equilibrium continuation values. Such an algorithm could be an important tool supporting empirical work based on this model. It would be desirable to extend this paper's model to allow for different proposer-coalition pairs to generate pies of different size. Among other things, one could then investigate the hypothesis that the coalitions that form are the most productive. Whether our uniqueness result extends to such a model is an open question.
In our framework there is a simple game (the system of winning coalitions) and other parameters, namely the recognition probabilities and the discount factors. To obtain a power index comparable to those mentioned in Section 2 one may take the limit of our vector of equilibrium continuation payoffs, for the case of symmetric recognition probabilities, as the common discount factor goes to one. Another possibility studied by Montero (2005) is to search for vectors of recognition probabilities that are self-confirming in the sense that they coincide with the resulting vector of continuation values. She shows that the nucleolus of a proper simple game 8 has this property. Comparison of the properties of the various power indices seems like an interesting direction for theoretical investigation.
